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Abstract
This article examines corruption in town planning practices and how this affects 
the reputation of local planning authority and residents’ compliance with planning 
laws. This was examined using a sample of 362 participants from a systematic 
sampling survey conducted in Lagos metropolitan area, Nigeria. Findings show 
that the conduct of planning officers significantly influences residents’ compliance 
with planning laws. Results also reveal that the use of procedural justice (fairness) 
in dealing with the public is extremely significant in building local town planning 
authority’s reputation (legitimacy). The survey found that, if town planning officers 
act corruptly (in discharging their duties), the public will be disrespectful of planning 
laws and town planning authority. The structural equation model results show that 
certain socio-economic characteristics of residents significantly predict compliance 
with planning laws, independent of planning officials’ corrupt behaviour. Specifically, 
compared to less educated residents, the more educated residents respect planning 
laws and view local planning authority as more legitimate. The article concludes that 
people are more satisfied with local planning authority or are more likely to voluntarily 
defer to planning laws when they view planning institutions as legitimate. A key 
component of this legitimacy is the use of procedural justice with the residents. The 
article suggests, inter alia, that local town planning authority and its officials need to 
become a democratically accountable institution, serving the public in a procedurally 
fair manner and without graft and bribery. Anti-corruption measures should be built 
into all planning systems as part of their structure. This article will contribute to urban 
and regional planning reform in Nigeria, with specific consideration for local planning 
authority, planning officials’ accountability, and improvement of the relationship 
between town planning authority and the public.
Keywords: Corruption, local town planning authority, planning laws, procedural 
justice, town planning officials
PERSEPSIES OOR KORRUPSIE EN NAKOMING VAN DIE 
ADMINISTRASIE VAN STADSBEPLANNINGSWETTE: DIE ERVARING VAN 
LAGOS METROPOLITAANSE GEBIED, NIGERIË
Hierdie artikel ondersoek korrupsie in stadsbeplanningspraktyke en hoe dit die reputasie 
van die plaaslike beplanningsowerheid en inwoners se nakoming van beplanningswette 
beïnvloed. Dit is ondersoek aan die hand van ’n steekproef van 362 deelnemers aan 
’n stelselmatige steekproefopname in die Lagos metropolitaanse gebied, Nigerië. 
Bevindinge toon dat die gedrag van beplanningsbeamptes beïnvloed beduidend 
inwoners se nakoming van beplanningswette. Resultate toon ook dat die gebruik 
van prosedurele geregtigheid (billikheid) 
in die omgang met die publiek uiters 
belangrik is in die opbou van die reputasie 
van plaaslike owerheidsbeplanning 
(legitimiteit). Die opname het bevind dat, 
wanneer die stadsbeplanningsbeamptes 
korrup optree (in die uitvoering van 
hul pligte), die publiek disrespekvol 
is teen beplanningswette en die 
stadsbeplanningsowerheid. Strukturele 
vergelyking model resultate toon dat 
sekere sosio-ekonomiese kenmerke 
van inwoners voorspel of hulle gaan 
voldoen aan die beplanningswette, 
onafhanklik van die korrupte gedrag 
van beplanningsamptenare. Spesifiek, 
in vergelyking met die minder opgeleide 
inwoners, respekteer die meer opgeleide 
inwoners die beplanningswette en beskou 
die plaaslike beplanningsowerheid as 
meer wettig. Die studie kom dus tot die 
gevolgtrekking dat mense meer tevrede 
is met die plaaslike beplanningsowerheid 
of dat hulle meer geneig is om vrywillig 
die beplanningswette te respekteer 
indien hulle die beplanningsinstelling 
as wettig beskou. Die gebruik van 
prosedurele geregtigheid by die inwoners 
is ’n belangrike onderdeel van hierdie 
legitimiteit. Die studie beveel aan dat 
die plaaslike beplannings owerheid 
en sy amptenare ’n demokraties-
verantwoordbare instelling moet word 
wat die publiek op ’n prosedureel 
billike manier dien, sonder omkopery. 
Maatreëls teen korrupsie moet in alle 
beplanningstelsels ingebou word as 
deel van die struktuur daarvan. Hierdie 
studie sal bydra tot die hervorming 
van stedelike en streeksbeplanning in 
Nigerië, met spesifieke inagneming van 
die plaaslike beplanningsowerheid, die 
verantwoordelikheid van beplannings-
beamptes en die verbetering van 
verhoudings tussen die stads-
beplanningsowerheid en die publiek.
Sleutelwoorde: Beplanningswette, 
korrupsie, plaaslike beplannings-
owerheid, prosedurele geregtigheid, 
stads beplan nings amptenare
MAIKUTLO MAPABI LE BOBOLU 
LE BOLATELI TSAMAISONG EA 
MELAO EA THERO EA LITOROPO: 
LIKETSAHALO TSA TOROPO EA 
LAGOS, NIGERIA
Sengodiloeng sena se lekola kammo 
bobodu tsamaisong le therong ea 
litoropo bo amang seriti sa batsamaisi, 
mmoho le kamoo baahi ba latelang 
melao ea thero ka teng. Boithuto bona 
bo entsoe ka ho hlahloba baahi ba 
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362 motse-moholo Lagos, Nigeria. 
Sephetho se fumane hore boitswaro ba 
batsamaisi ba toropo bo ama kamoo 
baahi ba latelang melao ea thero ea 
toropo ka teng. Se boetse se fumane 
hore seriti sa botsamaisi se ntlafatsoa 
ke ho hloka leeme le ho sebeletsa 
sechaba soohle ka toka. Boithuto bo 
fumane hape hore ha batsamaisi ba 
sebetsa ka bobodu le bomenemene, 
baahi le bona ha ba ikobele melao ea 
thero ea teropo mme ha ba hlomphe 
batsamaisi bao. Sephetho se boetse 
se fumane hore ka kakaretso baahi ba 
latela melao ea thero, le hoja batsamaisi 
bona ba bontsha bobodu. Ka kotloloho, 
papiso e bontsha ha baahi ba rutehileng 
ba latela melao ea thero mme ba tshepa 
botsamaisi ba toropo ho feta baahi ba 
sa rutehang. Boithuto bo qetella ka hore 
baahi ba khotsofatsoa ke batsamaisi, 
‘me ba latele melao ea thero ha mafapha 
a tsamaiso a sebetsa semolao. Taba 
e ka sehlohong ke hore mafapha a 
sebetseletse boohle ka toka. Ka hona, 
boithuto bo eletsa hore batsamaisi le 
liofisiri tsa thero ea litoropo ba lokela ho 
nka boikarabello bo phethahetseng ba 
demokrasi, mme ba sebeletse sechaba 
ka toka, ba nene tjotjo. Mekhoa ea ho 
thibela bobolu e lokela ho ahelloa ka 
hara meralo eohle ea thero ele karolo 
ea sebopeho sa eona. Boithuto bona bo 
kenya letsoho ntlafatsong ea thero ea 
litoropo naheng ea Nigeria, ka kotloloho 
khahlanong le bobolu ba liofisiri tse 
amehang, molemong oa likamano tse 
ntle le sechaba. 
1. INTRODUCTION
In 2019, Nigeria was ranked 146th 
out of 180 countries (180 = most 
corrupt) surveyed by the corruption 
perception index (TI, 2019: online). 
Nigeria’s rank from the survey shows 
that there is a lack of accountability 
and transparency from public 
officials, making corruptible acts more 
attractive and easier to get away 
with, within the country’s public sector 
(Omonijo, Nnedu & Uche, 2013: 10). 
Urban and regional planning laws 
regulate the use and development of 
land in a particular area. In practice, 
this is usually overseen by local 
government planning authorities 
through planning regulations, 
development control instruments and 
the issuance of building permits. The 
local planning authority also ensures 
that permits are issued only when 
applicants comply with applicable 
laws and regulations. Furthermore, 
compliance inspections are usually 
carried out at various stages of a 
development to ensure that the 
development meets the conditions on 
which the approval was granted and 
any applicable laws and regulations 
that apply. This process, however, 
has been accused of corruption 
practices (Chiodelli, 2018: 1615). 
Bribery, fraud, favouritism, 
nepotism and abuse of public 
office by town planning officials 
are common forms of corruption 
allegations in the administration 
town planning laws (TI, 2008: 2). 
According to the United Nations 
Department on Economic and Social 
Affairs (UNDESA, 2011: online), 
between 40% (Nigeria) and 60% 
(Pakistan and India) of people 
who dealt with land services were 
asked to pay bribes. Results from 
an online survey in 2013 show that 
88% of respondents indicated that 
it is impossible to obtain residential 
development permits without 
paying bribes. Such concerns about 
corruption in physical planning 
are also shared by commercial 
and business development 
(Zinnbauer, 2013: online). 
For instance, access to land and 
building permits has been rated 
as the most serious obstacle to 
business development in Nigeria 
(Adediran, 2017: 16) and in Russia 
(Kisunko & Cooldige, 2007: 10). 
It was reported that the Chinese 
authorities took action against local 
officials in as many as 168,000 
illegal land and building permits 
deals in 2004 alone (Phan, 2005: 
24). The current anti-corruption 
campaign in Lagos, Nigeria, 
uncovered thousands of illegal 
land and building matters in 2017 
(Adediran, 2017: 12). Emerging 
data from helplines operated by 
Transparency International (TI) 
further confirm these findings when 
the majority of the anti-corruption 
complaints received were from 
urban areas. Corruption in tems 
of land issue was the main issue 
of complaints (TI, 2008: 6). 
Over a quarter of public corruption 
cases reported by the news 
media in Italy are related to 
building development permits 
(Zinnbauer, 2015: online). Over 20% 
of corruption complaints received 
by the Australian Independent 
Commission Against Corruption in 
2004 were related to corruption in 
terms of building and development, 
whereas close to a quarter of 
reported corruption cases in the 
United States of America (USA) were 
related to urban planning issues 
(Dodson & Coiacetto, 2006: 12). 
In addition, a study on local level 
corruption in Spain found that 88% 
of all cases were related to urban 
planning (Jerez Darias, Martin & 
González, 2012: 5). Survey data by 
TI in Nigeria suggests that 45% of all 
corruption cases dealt with paying 
bribes for development permit and 
land services (TI, 2008: 14-16). 
Nigeria is ranked in the bottom 
quartile of all countries globally 
in terms of bureaucratic hurdles 
to registering land and buildings 
(Adediran, 2017: 16). Nigerian town 
planning authorities are unable 
to cope with demands and do not 
make fee information for registering 
land and buildings available through 
brochures, notice boards or online 
platform. Lagos metropolis, for 
example, received over 180,000 
planning applications between 
2005 and 2015, and was able to 
process fewer than 25% (Ministry 
of Physical Planning, 2015:3) 
The relationship between town 
planning officers and the public 
in Nigeria is at times troublesome 
(Badiora 2017: 2). Approval of 
developments and building plans 
sometimes deviates from the 
statutory requirements, as these are 
periodically done with hardly any or 
no regard for procedural fairness 
(Badiora, 2017: 2). It has been 
confirmed that, if the public adjudges 
an authority to use fair procedures, 
they would view the authority as 
being legitimate and would most 
likely comply with the laws (Hough, 
Jackson & Bradford, 2013: 348; 
Tankebe, 2009a: 1275; Bradford, 
Huq, Jackson & Roberts, 2014: 257; 
Jackson, Bradford, Hough & 
Zakar, 2014: 1077). When the 
public perceives or experiences 
unfairness, injustice, corrupt 
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practices and abuse of authority 
and power during the exercise of 
institutional responsibilities, they are 
likely to disrespect such authority 
and become defiant, contemptuous 
and non-compliant with the laws 
(Jackson et al., 2014; Murphy, 
Bradford & Jackson, 2016: 191; 
Sunshine & Tyler, 2003: 533; 
Tyler, 2006: 388).
Currently, no existing studies have 
explored how perceptions of town 
planners’ corruption affect Nigerians’ 
cynicism towards the planning laws 
and local town planning authority/
institutions’ reputation in Nigeria. It is, 
therefore, important to investigate 
the experiences and perceptions of 
town planning officials’ corruption, 
and procedural (in)justice in planning 
administration, in order to understand 
whether public experience and/
or perceptions of town planning 
officials’ corruption affect residents’ 
compliance with planning laws and 
how these unethical behaviours 
affect the local town planning 
authority’s reputation (legitimacy).
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
In order to understand corruption in 
town planning laws in Lagos, Nigeria, 
it is important to introduce the theory 
on planning corruption included 
in this article. The existing theory 
focuses on corruption in land-use 
planning; planning legislation and 
administration, as well as issues of 
compliance and cynicism towards 
the law in Lagos, Nigeria.
2.1 Corruption in 
land-use planning
While there is no universally agreed 
upon definition for corruption, 
Chiodelli and Moroni (2015: 
444), the United Nations Human 
Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) 
(2004: 2) and Nye (1967: 418) define 
corruption as the misuse of office 
and public power for private gain. 
This may include bribery (abuse of 
discretion in favour of a third party 
in exchange of benefits given by the 
third party); fraud (abuse of discretion 
for private gain without third parties’ 
involvement); favouritism, nepotism, 
and clientelism (abuse of discretion 
not for self-interest, but for the 
interest of family, clan, political 
party, and ethnic group, among 
others (UN-Habitat, 2004: 2).
There are three main types of 
corruption in the planning industry: 
legislative and regulatory corruption; 
bureaucratic corruption, and public 
works corruption. Legislative and 
regulatory corruption refers to the 
ways in which and the extent to 
which legislators can be influenced. 
According to Chiodelli and Moroni 
(2015: 445), individuals or interest 
groups can bribe rule makers to 
introduce or revise regulations that 
can change the economic benefits 
associated with certain situations. 
Bureaucratic corruption refers 
to corrupt acts of the appointed 
bureaucrats in their dealings 
with the public, whereas public 
works corruption is the systemic 
graft involved in building public 
infrastructures and services. 
Individuals bribe bureaucrats 
either to speed up bureaucratic 
procedures or to obtain a service 
that is not supposed to be available 
(Chiodelli & Moroni, 2015: 445).
A report by TI (2013: online) states 
that, globally, 27% of the population 
interviewed admitted to having paid 
some forms of graft in the preceding 
twelve months, with a rise on the 
previous year in the majority of 
places worldwide. This concerns both 
the developed and the developing 
countries. Corruption costs the 
African continent economies over 
US$148 billion annually. This leads 
to a loss of 50% in tax revenue; 
increases the cost of African goods 
by as much as 20% and eats away 
25% of Africa’s GDP (De Maria, 
2008: 325). Corruption is, therefore, 
negative not only because it clashes 
with the fundamental principles of 
fairness and respect for the rules, but 
also because it generates fallout. A 
prime example is the huge burden 
on the public purse. In Nigeria, for 
example, immediately after the 
President Muhammad Buhari Anti-
Corruption Inquiry, the costs of public 
works plummeted by nearly one half. 
This gives an idea of the amount 
of money previously taken from 
the public coffers to the advantage 
of corruptors and the corrupted. 
The phenomenon of corruption 
affects various areas of public 
activity, including the regulation and 
planning of land use. The majority 
of land services in sub-Saharan 
Africa is believed to take place 
off-budget, or is based on suspicious 
valuations (Fox, 2013: 11). At the 
heart of the problem is what is 
often referred to as a “development 
regulation crisis: as few as 30% of 
plots in developing countries are 
estimated to be formally registered” 
(Sioufi, 2011: 4). Insufficiently 
coordinated and recorded physical 
planning practices have, over 
decades or even centuries, created a 
patchwork of overlapping customary 
and statutory systems and conflicting 
claims, creating profound tenure 
insecurity, a dearth of reliable 
information on landownership, and 
a legal twilight zone that invites 
arbitrary administrative decisions 
and corruption (Magel & Wehrmann, 
2002: 1-15). Arial, Fagan and 
Zimmermann (2011: 1-12) assert that 
corruption in the land sector can be 
generally characterised as pervasive. 
Government bodies that oversee 
the land sector are one of the public 
entities most plagued by service-level 
bribery. Cullingworth (1993: 23-27) 
stresses the same point in that the 
problem (of corruption) is particularly 
acute in land-use planning, where the 
opportunities are far greater than in 
other areas of public policy. According 
to the TI (2013: online) inquiry, 21% 
of the respondents who admitted 
to having engaged in corrupt 
transactions reported that the bribe 
was linked to ‘land services’, and 
21% to ‘registry and permit services’ 
(this category includes, for example, 
building authorisation). Hence, it 
appears that a significant proportion 
of cases of corruption involve 
aspects of the planning domain. 
So far, corruption has assumed a 
particularly salient role in the practice 
of urban planning administration in 
Nigeria. Recently, there have been 
widespread reports of town planning 
officials’ corruption in Nigeria’s news 
(Punch News February, 2016: online). 
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The chairman of the Senate fact-
finding committee, Senator Dino 
Melaye, described the present 
situation as dangerous, and stressed 
the propensity of primitive mindsets 
of the people in Nigeria’s corridors 
of power (politicians alike) who have 
disregarded the rule of law governing 
land development, the environment, 
and other metrics of modern 
cosmopolitanism (Punch News 
February, 2016: online). Against the 
backdrop of the realities of urban 
land development practices, Dodson 
and Coiacetto (2006: 1-25) note that, 
despite the scholarly attempts to 
comprehend the land development 
process in cities, planning scholars 
have deliberately or inadvertently 
ignored issues of corruption. This 
situation is peculiar, given the 
potential for corruption to occur 
either grossly or subtly in planning 
processes, which significantly affects 
all aspirations for urban development 
(Zinnbauer, 2013: online). Improper 
urban planning practices will 
aggravate inequalities, marginalise 
and undermine the livelihoods of the 
urban poor, increase the vulnerability 
to natural disasters, and undermine 
economic development and social 
relations (Zinnbauer, 2015: online).
2.2 Planning legislation 
and administration
Prior to the colonial period, physical 
planning was under the control 
of traditional rulers in Lagos 
(Oduwaye, 2009: 7). During the 
colonial period (1854-1960), the first 
physical plan for Lagos started with 
the 1863 revolutionary comment of 
Sir Richard Burton in his book on 
West Africa, in which he suggested 
steps to be taken to clear the “Lagos 
Stables”, stating that “the site of 
Lagos is detestable”. Shortly after 
making these comments (in 1873), 
the acting Colonial Surveyors 
gazetted that “[h]ouseholders 
and owners of unoccupied 
lands throughout the town are 
requested to keep the streets 
clean and around their premises 
as part of measures to ensure a 
clean environment in Lagos”. 
Between 1899 and 1904, MacGregor 
established a Sanitary Board of 
Health to advise the governor 
on many township-improvement 
schemes. The 1902 Planning 
Ordinance empowered the governor 
to declare some areas as European 
Reservations with a Local Board 
of Health of their own. In 1917, 
Township Ordinance No. 29 was 
enacted. This promulgation made 
Lagos the only city in Nigeria 
with a Town Council. The 1917 
Township Ordinance did not allow 
for appreciable improvements of the 
traditional towns. This caused the 
disasters that led to the introduction 
of a planning ordinance to cover 
the native area of Lagos Island. 
The 1928 ordinance covers only the 
colony of Lagos, having established 
the Lagos Executive Development 
Board (LEDB), whose major task was 
to vet and approve building plans. 
In 1972, the LEDB merged with the 
Epe Area Planning Authority to form 
the physical planning authority of 
the Lagos State Development and 
Property Corporation (LSDPC). 
The LSDPC had the power to 
acquire, develop, hold, sell, 
lease and let any movable and 
immovable properties in the state. 
The creation of Lagos state in 
1972 brought about remarkable 
town planning efforts in the state. 
In 1973, the Lagos State Town and 
Country Planning Law, Cap. 133 
was enacted, with the specific aim 
to assemble existing planning laws 
under the new Act. These were the 
Western Regional Law No. 41 of 
1969; the Town and Country Planning 
Amendment Law; the Lagos Local 
Government Act of 1959-1964, 
Cap. 77; the Lagos Town Planning 
(Compensation) Act of 1964; the 
Lagos Executive Development Board 
(Power) Act of 1964; the Lagos Town 
Planning (Miscellaneous Provision) 
Decree of 1967; the Lagos State 
Town Planning (Miscellaneous 
Provision) Decree of 1967, and 
the Town Planning Authorities 
(Supervisory Power) Edict of 1971. 
Other town planning laws have been 
promulgated in Lagos State since 
1973. These include the Town and 
Country Planning (Building Plans) 
Regulations, LSLN No. 15 of 1982; 
the Guidelines for Approval of Layout, 
LSLN No. 6 of 1983; the Town and 
Country Planning Edict of 1985, 
and the Town and Country Planning 
(Building Plan) Regulations of 1986.
All these laws have had various 
degrees of success and failure. 
The success is associated with the 
systematic development of some 
state-of-the-art accommodation for 
people, while the failure is associated 
with exploitation among development 
control agencies in their decision to 
process and approve development 
proposals. This act has spread to 
the officials who collect bribe in the 
name of processing fees (Vivan, 
Kyom & Balasom, 2013: 46). Among 
the problems mostly cited are 
unfair treatment and the unethical 
composition of the Lagos Executive 
Development Board (LEDB) 
membership; no proper monitoring of 
planning schemes, leading, in some 
instances, to allotees abandoning 
plots, and inadequate number 
of professional town planners in 
government service (Adediran, 
2017:15). For instance, as provided 
by some of the Acts, particularly, 
the Town and Country Planning 
Edict of 1985, a town planning 
authority must have a minimum of 
four professionally registered town 
planners, in order to effectively 
provide the required leadership.
The 1998 Lagos State Urban and 
Regional Planning Edict No. 2 was 
formulated with the aim of improving 
these past planning legislations. 
It is also significant that this Edict 
was derived from the Nigerian 
Urban and Regional Planning Law 
Decree No. 88 of 1992. The most 
significant feature of the 1992 
law is that it provides for a federal 
planning framework, by recognising 
the three tiers of government (local, 
state, and federal) as the basis of 
physical planning. The 1992 law 
empowers each level of government 
(federal, state, and local) with some 
specific planning responsibilities. 
In fact, this move brought planning 
closer to the people. Despite the 
commendable efforts of the Lagos 
State 1998 planning law, there 
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are many emerging shortcomings. 
Some of these inadequacies are 
associated with the systematic 
development of innovative ideas, 
while others are associated with 
the unethical behaviour of the 
administrators and implementers 
of the laws (Oduwaye, 2009: 399). 
Among the problems mostly cited 
are unfair treatment of implementers 
of the provisions of the law and 
the unethical composition of 
the Lagos Planning Authority 
(LPA) board membership.
In order to address some of these 
shortcomings, the Lagos State 
Official Law No. 9 of 2005 was 
enacted for the ‘Administration 
of Physical Planning, Urban 
and Regional Development, 
Establishment and Functions of 
Physical Planning and Development 
Agencies in Lagos State’. The 
promoters of the law based its 
emergence on the improvement of 
previous planning laws in Lagos 
State, especially the 1998 Lagos 
State Urban and Regional Planning 
Edict. Major highlights of the 
2005 Lagos State Planning Law 
are the provision for the creation 
of an authority made up of the 
Lagos State Physical Planning and 
Development Authority; the Lagos 
Urban Renewal Authority, and any 
other agency, as may be established. 
The Lagos State Physical Planning 
and Urban Development Authority 
was responsible for all physical 
planning and urban development 
in Lagos State; the Lagos State 
Ministry of Physical Planning and 
Urban Development, when required, 
delegates specific responsibilities and 
functions related to implementation 
to the Authority. Among other 
provisions, the Ministry shall 
provide technical assistance to all 
government ministries and agencies 
on physical planning matters. 
The latest planning legislation is the 
Lagos State Urban and Regional 
Planning Law 2010. In accordance 
with its provisions, the Ministry 
of Physical Planning has three 
parastatals: Lagos State Physical 
Planning Permit Authority (LASPPPA); 
Lagos State Building Control 
Agency (LABSCA), and Lagos State 
Urban Renewal Agency (LASURA). 
The ministry and its agencies ensure 
regeneration and exercise control 
over development, with a view to 
entrenching a liveable environment. 
One unique reform entrenched in 
the law is the establishment of the 
Building Control Agency (BCA) to 
ensure quality construction and 
safety in buildings. The effective 
implementation of this law is aimed 
at reducing the incessant collapse 
of buildings in the State (Adediran, 
2017:17). Unfortunately, one year 
after the enactment of the law, BCA 
is yet to be properly established, 
and there are no regulations to drive 
the implementation of the building 
control activities. Consequently, in 
the absence of effective structure 
and regulations, one can hardly 
blame the untrained field officers’ 
practices of extorting members of the 
public in the name of building control 
enforcement. A major obstacle to 
the implementation of the building 
control system in Lagos State is the 
unwarranted subjugation to planning 
control (Adediran, 2017: 17). The 
policy of making building control an 
enforcement arm of the planning office 
is unconventional and inconsistent 
with global best practices. Various 
formalisation efforts have proven 
rather ineffective and, in many 
instances, it has encouraged land 
grabbing, due to weak urban planning 
legislative structures and privileged 
access to the knowledge, means and 
mechanism of law (Benjaminsen, 
Meinzen-Dick & Mwangi, 2009: 46). 
2.3 Issues of compliance 
and cynicism 
Most of the empirical studies suggest 
that between 20% and 40% of 
public funds are lost to forms of 
corruption (TI, 2008: 9; Zinnbauer, 
2015: online). Successive planning 
laws administrations have not been 
able to fully implement legitimately, 
accountably and publicly supported 
land-use planning for its citizens. 
The planning authorities’ officials have 
used this loophole to act corruptly 
(Jeong, 2016). This unbound power 
allows unscrupulous elites to flout 
laws or manufacture them to their 
advantage in the first place. Bribery 
helps them defend and expand 
their privileges and avoid justice 
and collective responsibilities – all 
at the cost of the wider community 
(Zinnbauer, 2013: online). Nigerians 
have been informally encouraged not 
to trust the state and its laws, and 
by extension, the planning authority 
as one of the visible representatives 
of the government and executor 
of laws. This has led to a situation 
where people do not comply with 
planning laws and thereby become 
disrespectful to the local planning 
authority enforcing it (Badiora, 2017). 
Just as a corrupt police force 
similarly fuels and does not curb 
violence and insecurity, which fatally 
undermine trust in the legitimacy of 
political institutions and the rule of 
law in Nigeria (Akinlabi, 2015: 422; 
2016: 166), town planning officials’ 
bias, favouritism and extent of 
unfair treatment of people continue 
to play crucial roles in explaining 
public distrust towards the planning 
law that has dragged the image of 
Nigeria’s town planning authority 
in the mud (Badiora, 2017: 10; 
Adediran, 2017: 11). In addition, the 
local planning authority officials have 
historical records of corruption and the 
use of excessive unfair procedures 
in discharging their duties (Chiodelli 
& Moroni, 2015: 449). Consequently, 
they are regarded as corrupt officers. 
On many occasions, these officials 
have been accused of unfairness in 
dealing with citizens. Regrettably, 
from senior officers to the junior ones, 
there is an overwhelming evidence 
of bribery, cunning behaviour, 
and extortion (Chiodelli & Moroni 
2015:452). There is a gross disparity 
between how these planning authority 
officials treat family, friends and 
influential members of society as well 
as those who are ready to bribe their 
way and how they respond to the 
general public (Badiora, 2017: 15). 
Researchers have shown that, 
where there are strong indications 
of corruption, unfairness, procedural 
injustice and negative perceptions 
of authority’s activities, people 
tend to be distrustful of the law 
(Jackson et al., 2014:1077; 
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Tankebe, 2009b: 268). This is often 
referred to as legitimacy. Legitimacy is 
defined as “a property of an authority 
or institution that leads people to 
feel that that authority or institution is 
entitled to be obeyed” (Sunshine & 
Tyler, 2003: 522; Jackson & Bradford, 
2010: 255). Legitimacy is linked to 
properties of the authority that lead 
people to feel it is entitled to be 
obeyed and it reflects a social value 
orientation toward institutions (Murphy 
& Cherney, 2012:199; Murphy & Tyler, 
2008: 677; Tyler, 2011b: 260). That is, 
people defer to, and obey an official 
directive by institutions (such as town 
planning authority), because they 
trust the institution’s authority to make 
decisions and not because of the 
threat of sanction for disobedience. 
The legitimacy of an institution 
comprises both instrumental and 
normative aspects. According to 
the instrumental perspective, such 
legitimacy is linked to instrumental 
evaluations of three elements: 
performance, risk, and judgements 
about distributive justice (Sunshine & 
Tyler, 2003: 532). This instrumental 
view suggests that a planning 
authority can increase support from 
the public when they effectively control 
development (performance), create a 
credible means of sanctioning those 
who do not comply with planning 
laws (deterrence), and fairly execute 
planning services across people and 
communities (distributive justice). The 
normative perspective of legitimacy 
comprises a number of aspects, 
the most important of which being 
procedural justice. Thibaut and 
Walker (1975: 2) coined the term 
‘procedural justice’ to refer to people’s 
perceptions of the treatment they 
receive during the processes involved 
in decision-making. Procedural justice 
is mostly concerned with making 
decisions based on fair procedures. 
It engenders support for authority 
when the public perceives that the 
procedures adopted by the officials 
of authority treat them with dignity 
and respect. In addition, people’s 
satisfaction with the procedures 
and treatment used during the 
processes of decision-making 
were reported not to be solely 
dependent on the outcome of 
decision-making, as further studies 
have found that an authority’s 
legitimacy is linked to people’s 
satisfaction with the procedural justice 
aspects of their encounter with that 
authority (Lyn & Kristina 2007: 33; 
Tankebe, 2009b: 1287). 
According to Tyler (2011a: 12-13), 
important factors that people consider 
when deciding if they have received 
procedural justice are whether they 
are treated fairly, whether they are 
treated with respect and dignity, 
and whether concerns are shown 
for their views. Therefore, an active 
participation (public participation) in 
discussions prior to town planning 
authority decision-making (i.e., people 
being given the opportunity to explain 
their views before planning officials 
decide on a course of action), planning 
authority decision-making that is 
neutral and objective (i.e., evidence 
that planning officials treat everyone in 
a like manner), and being treated with 
dignity and respect are key aspects of 
procedural justice in decision-making.
3. STUDY AREA
The city of Lagos, Nigeria, is located 
in the southwestern part of Nigeria, 
approximately between longitude 
2042ʹE and 3042ʹE, and latitude 6022ʹN 
Figure 1: Map of Lagos metropolis showing the study area (built-up area)
Source: COPINE, 2016: 3.
Adewumi I. Badiora • Perceptions on corruption and compliance in the administration of town planning laws
7
and 6052ʹ. Lagos metropolis lies 
generally on lowlands, with roughly 
18,782 ha of built-up area (see 
Figure 1). The Lagos metropolis is 
the business and industrial capital 
of Nigeria and is administratively 
divided into different local authorities. 
The population density is 13,405 
individuals/km2. Lagos’ population 
grew from the estimated 250,000 in 
1854 to 600,000 in 1960 and from 
5.3 million in 1995 to 9.3 million 
in 2006. In 2016, the population 
of the city of Lagos was 22.5 
million (NBS, 2016: 14). Current 
demographic trends show that 
Lagos’ population growth rate of 
8% has resulted in its harbouring 
36.8% (an estimated 60.8 million) 
of Nigeria’s estimated 190 million 
urban populations (NBS, 2016: 14). 
The implication is that, whereas 
Nigeria’s population growth is 
globally 2%, Lagos’ population figure 
is growing ten times faster than 
that of New York (16.9%) and Los 
Angeles (13.3%). This has serious 
consequences for land-use planning 
in the State, especially in urban areas. 
The considerable geographical size 
and population density of the study 
area underscores the responsibility 
and the volume of work involved in 
the effective development control 
and physical planning and land 
services. Ironically, except for Abuja, 
Lagos is known as the best served 
urban area in terms of physical 
planning laws; yet the administration 
of physical planning law is most 
ineffective, due to high population 
and corruption (Adediran, 2017: 2).
For the purpose of land-use planning 
and administration, the Lagos built-
up area is structured into 20 local 
town planning and land services 
authorities. Because of the volume of 
development and works and for the 
effective development control in the 
built-up area, the State government 
created an additional 37 local council 
development authorities (LCDAs) with 
all the characteristics and functions of 
the local town planning authorities.
4. METHODOLOGY
This study examines whether 
residents of the Lagos metropolitan 
area will comply or not with planning 
laws and regard local planning 
authority as a reputable institution 
if they perceive town planning 
administrators as corrupt public 
officials and/or have had actual or 
indirect experiences of planning 
officers’ corruption and procedural (in)
justice. Using a qualitative research 
design, a structured questionnaire 
survey set six constructs with 
20 measures on the variables of 
corruption in planning law and 
administration extracted from 
literature. Bivariate correlation tests 
were used to assess relationships 
among these corruption variables 
(Carpenter, 2018: 1599). Exploratory 
factor analysis (EFA) was used to 
reduce these measured variables 
to smaller factors on corruption 
(Rossoni, Engelbert & Bellegard, 
2016: 201). Structural equation 
model (SEM) was used to examine 
the influence of procedural justice, 
experience and perception of planning 
officers’ corruption on cynicism 
towards planning laws and authority 
in Nigeria (Westland, 2015: 1).
4.1 Sampling size and methods
A multi-stage sampling technique 
was used in the selection of research 
participants (Ojewale, 2015: 7). 
In the first stage, the 16 local 
government areas (LGAs) within 
Lagos metropolis were stratified 
into low-, medium- and high-density 
areas. In this study, an LGA with a 
population of 20-10,000 individuals/
km2 is regarded as low density, 
while the medium and high densities 
have 10,001-20,000 individuals/
km2 and above 20,000 individuals/
km2, respectively. The simple random 
sampling technique was used to 
select Eti-osa, Ikeja and Mushin 
areas from the low-, medium- and 
high-density areas, respectively 
(Sharma, 2017: 750). In the second 
stage, the three selected LGAs were 
stratified into existing electoral wards 
as recognised by the Independent 
National Electoral Commission 
(INEC). Information obtained from 
INEC showed that there were fourteen 
electoral wards in Mushin LGA, while 
Ikeja and Eti-osa LGAs have ten (10) 
wards each. One out of every four 
(4) wards in each LGA was selected 
through a simple random sampling 
without replacement. Thus, ten (10) 
political wards were surveyed. There 
were 15,275 residential buildings 
in the selected political wards, 
with 8,996, 3,780 and 2,499 in the 
high-, medium- and low-density 
areas, respectively. Systematic 
random sampling technique was 
adopted in selecting one out of every 
twenty buildings (5%). Using this 
method, a total of 768 buildings was 
sampled (Sharma, 2017: 750).
4.2 Data collection
The author and third-year students 
from the Joseph Ayo Babalola 
University, Ikeji-Arakeji, Nigeria, 
administered a face-to-face structured 
questionnaire survey to 768 residents 
in the study area from January to 
April 2016. Residents who had direct 
or indirect contact with planning 
officers were targeted. Where none 
of the members in the selected 
building had contact with planning 
officers, the next available building 
was sampled. Based on the literature 
review, constructs on corruption in the 
questionnaire included procedural 
justice that measured respondents’ 
general views about the way in which 
town planning officials and vigilante 
corps generally make decisions 
and treat citizens; legitimacy that 
measured the reputation of town 
planning authority and the extent to 
which local town planning authority 
are seen to have legitimate authority; 
planners’ corruption that assessed 
vicarious experiences of town 
planning officials’ corruption and not 
the actual experiences of corruption; 
perception of planners’ corruption 
that obtained data about residents’ 
awareness or understanding of 
sensory information about land-use 
corruption; experience of planners’ 
corruption that assessed actual 
experiences of corruption, and 
compliance/cynicism with planning 
laws that assessed distrust towards 
the planning laws and authority. 
A section on the respondent’s 
profile obtained socio-demographic 
information on gender, education 
qualification, income level and 
ethnicity. The respondents were 
required to indicate their level of 
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agreement, in practice, with the 
20 measures defining corruption 
practices. The data from these 
measurements forms the variables 
used in the EFA and SEM, which 
tested the interrelationships 
among these factors. To reduce 
the respondents’ bias, closed-
ended questions were preferred 
(Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2003: 232). 
This study upholds avoidance of 
harm, confidentiality and informed 
consent during data collection.
4.3 Response rate
From the 768 original questionnaires, 
362 completed questionnaires were 
returned, resulting in a response 
rate of 47%. According to Baruch 
& Holtom (2008: 1153), average 
response rates for studies at 
organisational level are 37.2% 
and 52.7% at individual level. 
4.4 Data analysis and 
interpretation of the findings
Data on the respondents’ socio-
economic characteristics were 
analysed using descriptive statistics. 
The 20 corruption items were 
rated on a five-point Likert scale to 
measure the respondents’ opinions 
(Leedy & Ormrod, 2014: 185). 
The following scale measurement 
was used regarding mean scores, 
where 1 = Strongly disagree (≥1.00 
and ≤1.80); 2 = Disagree (≥1.81 and 
≤2.60); 3 = Neutral (≥2.61 and ≤3.40); 
4 = Agree (≥3.41 and ≤4.20), and 5 
= Strongly agree (≥4.21 and ≤5.00). 
For analysis of the internal reliability 
of the items in the questionnaire, 
Cronbach’s alpha values were 
tested with a cut-off value of 0.70 
(Tavakol & Dennick, 2011: 54-55).
Bivariate correlation tests were 
applied to the data to show the 
comparative relationship between all 
six of the non-controlling independent 
variables (constructs) with test values 
between -1 (negative relationship), 
0 (no relationship) and +1 (positive 
relationship) (Carpenter, 2018: 1600). 
EFA using principal-axis factoring 
with oblique rotation was conducted 
to test for the assumed conceptual 
differentiation between all six of 
the non-controlling independent 
variables (Osborne, 2015: 1). 
The measured variables (control, 
non-controlling independent 
variables, and dependent variable) 
were subjected to a SEM. By using 
the structural equation model, the 
study was able to take an account 
of the interrelationships among all 
variables at once and ascertain the 
relative strength of predictor variables 
on the outcome variables of interest 
(i.e., ‘legitimacy of planning authority’ 
and ‘non-compliance with planning 
laws’). In a structural equation model, 
all variables are simultaneously 
considered (Westland, 2015: 1).
4.5 Limitations
The study was not conducted 
across Nigeria; therefore, the 
findings cannot be generalised.
5. RESULTS AND 
DISCUSSION
5.1 Respondents’ profile 
Table 1 displays the demographic 
profile of participants. The majority 
(71%) of the respondents were male, 
and Nigerian (99%). The majority 
(80%) of the respondents had formal 
education and 50% obtained a 
post-secondary school education. 
Only 8% of the respondents earned 
an average monthly income below 
the national minimum wage of 
N18000.00k (equivalent to US$50, 
as at April 2017), while 20% earned a 
monthly income above N100000.00k 
(US$278). Of the respondents, 41% 
were aged between 22 and 40 years, 
while 29% were above 60 years old. 
Of the residents of Lagos metropolis, 
1% were non-Nigerians, while 99% 
were Nigerians distributed across 
major national ethnic groups (Hausa 
[11%], Igbo [25%] and Yoruba [50%]). 
Hence, the study area is cosmopolitan 
in nature, even though the Yoruba 
tribe still has the majority of residents.
5.2 Bivariate analysis
Table 2 shows the correlation 
coefficients results for relationships 
among the variables in the six 
corruption constructs. A negative 
correlation (r = -0.63) was found 
between compliance with planning 
Table 1: Socio-economic characteristics of respondents






Primary school education 36 10
Secondary school education 72 20
Post-secondary school education 181 50
Income group (in naira)





101000 and above 72 20
Age group
22-40 years 148 41
41-60 years 107 30





Others (Nigerian) 47 13
Non-Nigerian 04 01
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regulations and planning officers’ 
corruption. This suggests that 
residents’ compliance with planning 
laws and regulations decreases with 
an increase in corruption practices 
among the planning officers. 
A significant negative correlation 
exists between compliance with 
planning laws and perceptions 
of planning officers’ corruption 
(r = -.49) and experiences of planning 
officers’ corruption (r = -.47). These 
findings show that residents who 
had experienced planners’ abuse 
of office and those who perceived 
urban planners as being corrupt 
are more likely to disobey planning 
laws. Similarly, negative correlations 
were found between residents’ 
perception of planning officers’ 
corruption (r = -.52); experience of 
planning officers’ corruption (r = -.59), 
and local town planning authority 
legitimacy. These results show 
that those who had experienced 
town planners’ corruption and 
those who perceived town planning 
officers as being corrupt are more 
likely not to view physical planning 
authority as a legitimate institution. 
Procedural justice had a positive 
correlation (r = .51) with residents’ 
compliance with planning laws. 
To corroborate this, findings 
established negative correlations 
between residents’ perception of 
planning officers’ corruption (r = 
-.40), experience of planning officers’ 
corruption (r = -.58), and procedural 
justice. These findings further show 
that those who perceived planning 
officers as corrupt and those who 
had experienced the town planners’ 
bias will be more likely to take in that 
the planning officers do not use fair 
procedures. If the officials follow due 
procedure and treat people equally 
in their dealings with members 
of the public, people will comply 
with planning laws. Furthermore, 
residents who do not view the local 
planning authority as a reputable or 
legitimate institution are not likely 
to comply with planning. This was 
confirmed as a positive correlation 
(r = .44) established between 
compliance with planning regulations 
and legitimacy of planning authority.
5.3 Mean score and exploratory 
factor analysis
An overview of the MS of constructs 
on corruption in Table 3 shows 
that all the constructs have 
Cronbach’s alpha greater than 
0.70, indicating acceptable internal 
reliability, as recommended by 
Hair, Black, Babin and Anderson 
(2014). With mean score ratings 
above 3.5, respondents “agree” 
with all the corruption variables 
in the constructs: ‘town planners’ 
corruption’; ‘experience of planning 
officers’ corruption’, and ‘residents’ 
non-compliance with planning laws’.
The 20 corruption non-controlling 
independent variables were 
subjected to EFA to study the trend of 
inter-correlations between variables 
and to group these variables with 
similar characteristics into a set of 
reduced factors. The results report 
the factor extraction, Eigenvalues, 
explained variance and correlation. 
In Table 3, using a cut-off value 
of initial Eigenvalues greater than 
one (>1.0), 5 factors explain a 
cumulative variance of 72%, where 
factor one explains 20% of the 
total variance; factor two (16%); 
factor three (12%); factor four 
(11%), and factor five (13%). Using 
principal-axis factoring with oblique 
rotation and significant factor of 
>0.30, Table 3 shows the correlation 
between constructs and variables 
after rotation. The only construct 
that did not appear to form its own 
separate factor was the perception 
of planning officers’ corruption 
that loaded onto the experience of 
planning officers’ corruption factor.
Table 2: Bivariate associations between the constructs in the study
Construct 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 Planners’ corruption --
2 Procedural justice .51** --
3 Legitimacy of planning authority .60** .49** --
4 Residents’ perception of planners’ corruption -.49** -.40** -.52** --
5 Experience of planners’ corruption -.47** -.58** -.59** .34** --
6 Compliance with planning regulations -.63** .41** .44** .52** .40** --
Note:** p<.001
Figure 2: Structural equation model (SEM) of influence of procedural 
justice, experience and perception of planning officers’ corruption 
on cynicism towards planning laws and authority in Nigeria
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Table 3: Factor analysis differentiating non-control corruption variables
Constructs and variables
Factor
1 2 3 4 5
Town planners’ corruption (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.91; MS = *3.66; SD = 0.60)
*A high MS indicates greater perceptions of town planners’ corruption
Planning officers often take bribes from developers 0.89
Planning officers are often paid by developers to overlook development control matters 0.77
Planning officers often do not follow due process, because the developer is related to a planning officer 0.43
Planning officers do not follow due process, because the developer is influential or knows influential 
citizen(s) 0.55
Procedural justice (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.73, *MS = 3.41, SD = .59)
*A high MS reflects greater perceptions of procedural justice
Planning officers treat people fairly 0.99
Planning officers treat everyone equally 0.42
Planning officers treat people with dignity and respect 0.38
Planning officers listen to people before making decisions 0.56
Planning officers are always polite when dealing with different people 0.67
Legitimacy of local planning authority (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.75, *MS = 3.54, SD = 0.65)
*A high MS reflects greater perceived legitimacy
Local planning authority do their job well 0.79
I have confidence in the local planning authority 0.77
I have great respect for the local planning authority 0.76
Developers should follow instructions of the local planning authority 0.35
Experience of planning officers’ corruption (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.79, *MS = 3.51, SD = 0.67) 
*A high MS indicates greater experiences of planners’ corruption. (Perception of planners’ corruption [Cronbach’s alpha = .84, *MS = 3.00, SD = 0.69] *A high 
MS means greater perceptions of planners’ corruption)
Planning officers have asked me to offer a bribe 0.38
I have been in a situation where a planning officer extorts money from me 0.44
I have heard about someone being asked to offer a bribe 9.57
I am of the opinion that planning officers are corrupt 0.57
Residents’ non-compliance with planning laws (Cronbach’s alpha = .84; *MS = 3.53; SD = 0.59) 
*A high MS reflects greater perceptions of cynicism towards the law
It is all right to sometimes ignore planning regulations 0.66
There is inequality in the planning law and it is not enacted to protect my interest 0.56
The planning law represents those in power and not the values of people like me 0.49
Eigenvalues 5.09 1.16 1.06 0.95 1.61
Explained variance (%) 20 16 12 11 13
Note: Principal-axis factoring, using oblique rotation with Kaizer normalisation. Only factor loadings >0.30 are displayed. Pattern matrix 
coefficients displayed
5.4 Structural equation model
Figure 2 is a diagrammatic 
representation of the results 
of the SEM showing the 
influence of procedural justice, 
experience and perception of 
planning officers’ corruption 
on cynicism towards planning 
laws and authority in Nigeria. 
Using all variables and constructs 
included in this study, 47% of the 
variation in the reputation (legitimacy) 
of physical planning authority can 
be explained by five of the predictor 
variables, namely ‘procedural justice’, 
‘experience of planning officers’ 
corruption’, ‘perception of planning 
officers’ corruption’, ‘education 
level’, and ‘age of respondent’ were 
significant predictors of local planning 
authority reputation (legitimacy). 
More specifically, respondents who 
were older and those who were 
more educated viewed physical 
planning authority as more legitimate 
(β = 0.17, p <.001 and β = 0.11, 
p <.001, respectively). People 
who believe the physical planning 
authority use procedural justice 
in their dealings with the public 
(β = 0.28, p <.001) were more 
likely to regard physical planning 
authority as legitimate. Those who 
have experienced planning officers’ 
corruption (β = -0.22, p <.001), and 
those who perceived that planning 
officers are corrupt (β = -0.31, 
p <.001) were more likely not to 
regard local planning authority as 
a reputable institution (legitimate). 
Of particular importance in this 
instance is that procedural justice 
(when planning officers treat people 
fairly) had a greater effect on 
physical planning authority reputation 
(legitimacy) than either of the two 
corruption variables (experienced 
planning officers’ corruption and 
perception of planning officers’ 
corruption), but only marginally so. 
This can be noted in the relative 
sizes of the β values computed.
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Of interest were the variables that 
predicted compliance with planning 
laws. A total of 52% of the variation 
in compliance with planning laws 
could be explained by five variables, 
namely ‘legitimacy’, ‘procedural 
justice’, ‘experience of planning 
officers’ corruption’, ‘perception of 
planning officers’ corruption’ and 
‘income level’ significantly predicted 
‘compliance with planning laws’. 
Income level had a negative effect 
on compliance with planning laws 
(β = -0.8, p <.03), suggesting that 
those with higher incomes were very 
likely not to comply with planning 
laws. Furthermore, experience 
of planning officers’ corruption 
(β = -0.12, p <.01) and perception 
that planning officers are corrupt 
(β = -0.28, p <.001) had a negative 
effect on compliance with planning 
laws. However, people who were 
more likely to comply with planning 
laws believe that planning officers 
use procedural justice (fairness) 
when dealing with people (β = 0.14, 
p <.001) and that local planning 
authority are a reputable (legitimate) 
institution (β = 0.32, p <.001).
6. CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS
As the first research to apply 
procedural justice in the study 
of town planning practice in 
Nigeria, this study examined the 
pervasive problem of corruption in 
local town planning authority and 
how these unethical behaviours 
affect residents’ compliance with 
planning laws and reputation of 
town planning authority in Nigeria.
The study analysed six constructs on 
the level of agreement with 20 factors 
influencing corruption in local town 
planning authority based on extant 
literature via a questionnaire requiring 
respondents to rate the factors as 
they were perceived. With mean 
score ratings above 3.5, respondents 
“agree” with all the corruption factors 
in the constructs: ‘town planners’ 
corruption’; ‘experience of planning 
officers’ corruption’, and ‘residents’ 
non-compliance with planning laws’.
Correlation of the various factors 
influencing corruption shows that 
the association between compliance 
with planning laws, experience 
and perception of planning officers’ 
corruption was entirely in the 
negative direction. This means that 
higher levels of planning officers’ 
corruption predicted lower levels of 
compliance with planning laws in 
Nigeria. By contrast, the association 
between compliance with planning 
laws and procedural justice was 
positive. This connotes that a higher 
level of compliance with planning 
laws was associated with a higher 
level of procedural justice. In other 
words, the use of procedural justice 
or fairness by planning officers in 
dealing with the public is relevant 
in building positive perceptions of 
planning officers and the physical 
planning authority in Nigeria.
The structural equation model found 
that compliance with planning laws 
appears to be influenced more by 
the behaviour of planning officers. In 
this study, planning officers’ corrupt 
behaviour had a negative effect on 
compliance. The model also suggests 
that procedural justice (fairness) 
is marginally more important in 
building physical planning authority’s 
reputation (legitimacy). Hence, in 
Nigeria, people’s perceptions of 
physical planning authority (legitimacy) 
are enhanced by procedural justice. 
Findings showed that physical 
planning authority’s reputation or 
legitimacy influences the public’s 
compliance with the planning laws. 
Legitimacy was found to be the single 
strongest predictor of compliance 
with planning laws. Corruption 
variables (experience and perception 
when combined) were the strongest 
predictors of compliance with planning 
laws in the model. It could, therefore, 
be inferred from the findings that 
most of the problems confronting 
physical planning practice in the 
study area could be due to corruption. 
Findings revealed that this societal 
anomaly, as a consequence, has 
negatively affected physical planning 
authority’s reputation. This outcome 
calls for a serious examination of 
the current physical development 
control practices in Nigeria. Negative 
perceptions of planning officers’ 
activities, involvement in corrupt 
practices often engender scorn 
towards the planning laws and 
the physical planning authority 
enforcing it. In other words, corruption 
undermines public confidence in 
the physical planning authority and 
the reputation of the institution. 
Policymakers in reforming the physical 
planning administration in Nigeria 
should motivate people to comply with 
laws or to cooperate with planning 
authority by developing better public 
participation. It is recommended that, 
in the long term, effective regulation 
by planning authority depends on their 
ability to gain consent and cooperation 
from the public. This study has 
shown that people are more satisfied 
with physical planning authority or 
are more likely to voluntarily defer 
to planning laws when they view 
planning authority as legitimate. 
A key component of this legitimacy 
is the use of procedural justice 
with the public. Physical planning 
authority have the opportunity to 
proactively enhance their reputation 
(legitimacy) and public participation 
by identifying in encounters with 
the public where existing practices 
and procedures could be enhanced, 
revised or implemented using 
procedural justice principles as basis. 
For planning authority to control 
development and to gain public 
support, they need to become 
a democratically accountable 
institution, where their objective 
will be to serve the public in a 
procedurally fair manner and without 
bias. The Nigerian government 
should provide the enabling 
legislations for urban planning 
practice and enforcement of the laws 
to stop the current urban planning 
and development practices based 
on a weak legislative framework.
7. FUTURE RESEARCH
The present study did not address 
the influence of the physical 
planning system itself (the law 
and administrative procedures) on 
compliance and/or cynicism towards 
planning laws. Future studies should 
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explore some of the principles and 
techniques (development rights, 
land rent, and formal equality in a 
quantitative version) that can be 
implemented to contain corruption 
at the outset of planning laws.
The influence of specific social 
characteristics such as, for example, 
gender and ethnicity, among others, 
on cynicism towards planning laws 
was not addressed in this study and 
could be explored in future analysis. 
Using only a statistical analysis 
approach, this study presented 
a good sense of how end-users 
(residents) viewed the land-use 
planning practices and perceived 
systemic problems of planning 
practice in Nigeria. As there is no 
qualitative information available, 
the perspectives on the nature and 
extent of corruption (explanations and 
excuses, among others) from those 
working as planners or town planning 
officials in the Nigerian system should 
be considered in future research.
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